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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV
In the principal case the defendant had never forfeited the land
to the state, and consequently had no right to redeem it. There-
fore, the act had no application and could not be pleaded.
E.L.L.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE-Plain-
tiff, with approval of the district judge, compromised his claim
under the Workmen's Compensation Act' before the duration of
his disability was definitely ascertainable. It later appeared that
he was totally disabled and he now seeks to set aside the com-
promise agreement. Held, the compromise was not binding and
full compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
allowed.2 Puchner v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation,
La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 36,146 (1941).
No provision of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act
mentions compromise by name, but Section 173 gives interested
parties "the right to settle all matters of compensation between
themselves" provided such settlement is (1) "reduced to writing,"
(2) "substantially in accord with the various provisions of this
act," and (3) "approved by the court."
The courts of appeal have consistently held valid a compro-
mise entered into by an injured workman and his employer and
approved by the proper court4 where there was a bona fide dispute
as to the liability of the employer,5 the extent of the injury,6 the
1. La. Act 20 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1932) H§ 4391-4434].
2. The penalty of fifty per cent under the act originally imposed on the
defendant was eliminated on rehearing because the defendant had acted in
reliance upon the prior jurisprudence of the courts of appeal holding such
compromises valid.
3. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 17, as last amended by La. Act 38 of 1918, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1932) § 4407].
4. Bradford v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 190 So. 210 (La. App. 1939).
See Calhoun v. Louisiana Delta Hardwood Lumber Co., 182 So. 362 (La. App.
1938).
5. Homey v. Scott, 171 So. 172 (La. App. 1936); Calhoun v. Louisiana
Delta Hardwood Lumber Co., 182 So. 362 (La. App. 1938); Cognolatti v. Legion
Pants Co., 186 So. 377 (La. App. 1939); Weaver v. Mutual Building & Home-
stead Association, 195 So. 384 (La. App. 1940); White v. Osterland & Knight
Timber Co., 200 So. 674 (La. App. 1941). See Faircloth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg.
Co., 147 So. 368, 370 (La. App. 1933); Young v. Marx & Son, 189 So. 167, 168
(La. App. 1939); Self v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 189 So. 327, 329 (La. App. 1939);
Bradford v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 190 So. 210, 211 (La. App. 1939);
Walding v. Caldwell Brothers & Hart, 193 So. 501, 502-503 (La. App. 1940);
McDaniel v. Great Southern Lumber Co., Inc., 197 So. 812, 815 (La. App. 1940).
In all cases, to sustain a compromise there must be a bona fide dispute.
Fluitt v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry., 187 La. 87, 174 So. 163 (1937). See Eaglin
v. Southern Kraft Corp., 200 So. 63 (La. App. 1941).
6. Crawford v. Crawford Lumber Co., 1 La. App. 636 (1925); Grace v.
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duration of the disability,7 or the amount of compensation." How-
ever, where fraud, ill practice, or misrepresentation was employed
in inducing the employee to accept the settlement, the courts
have held the compromise invalid.' This jurisprudence has been
based chiefly on two supreme court cases-Musick v. Central Car-
bon Company'O and Young v. Glynn.11
Eistenhuth, 150 So. 398 (La. App. 1933); Homey v. Scott, 171 So. 172 (La. App.
1936); Self v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 189 So. 327 (La. App. 1939); Young v. Marx
& Son, 189 So. 167 (La. App. 1939); Bradford v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 190 So. 210 (La. App. 1939); Walding v. Caldwell Brothers & Hart, 193
So. 501 (La. App. 1940); White v. Osterland & Knight Timber Co., 200 So. 674
(La. App. 1941). See Moss v. Levin, 120 So. 258, 259, 260 (La. App. 1929); Fair-
cloth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 147 So. 368, 370 (La. App. 1933); Reid v.
Florio & Co., Inc., 172 So. 572, 574 (La. App. 1937); Cognolattt v. Legion Pants
Co., 186 So. 377, 379 (La. App. 1939); Weaver v. Mutual Building and Home-
stead Ass'n, 195 So. 384, 388 (La. App. 1940); McDaniel v. Great Southern
Lumber Co., Inc., 197 So. 812, 815 (La. App. 1940).
7. Crawford v. Crawford Lumber Co., 1 La. App. 636 (1925); Cognolattl
v. Legion Pants Co., 186 So. 377 (La. App. 1939); Young v. Marx & Son, 189
So. 167 (La. App. 1939); Bradford v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 190 So.
210 (La. App. 1939); Walding v. Caldwell Brothers & Hart, 193 So. 501 (La.
App. 1940); Forrestal v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp., 196 So. 516 (La.
App. 1940). See Faircloth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 147 So. 368, 370 (La. App.
1933); Self v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 189 So. 327, 329 (La. App. 1939); Weaver v.
Mutual Building and Homestead Ass'n, 195 So. 384, 388 (La. App. (1940); Mc-
Daniel v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 197 So. 812, 815 (La. App. 1940); White
v. Osterland & Knight Timber Co., 200 So. 674, 676 (La. App. 1941).
8. Forrestal v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp., 196 So. 516 (La. App.
1940); McDaniel v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 197 So. 812 (La. App. 1940).
See Moss v. Levin, 120 So. 258, 259 (La. App. 1929); Faircloth v. Stearns-Roger
Mfg. Co., 147 So. 368, 370 (La. App. 1933); Cognolatti v. Legion Pants Co.,
186 So. 377, 379 (La. App. 1939); Young v. Marx & Son, 189 So. 167, 168 (La.
App. 1939); Self v. Wyatt Lumber Co., Inc., 189 So. 327, 329 (La. App. 1939);
Bradford v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 190 So. 210, 211 (La. App. 1939);
Walding v. Caldwell Brothers & Hart, 193 So. 501, 502-503 (La. App. 1940);
Weaver v. Mutual Building and Homestead Ass'n, 195 So. 384, 388 (La. App.
1940); White v. Osterland & Knight Timber Co., .200 So. 674, 676 (La. App.
1941); McCastle v. Architectural Stone Co., 4 So. (2d) 120, 122 (La. App. 1941).
9. McHenry v. Wall, 157 So. 632 (La. App. 1934); Miller v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 169 So. 258 (La. App. 1936) (petition alleging fraud
states a cause of action); Calhoun v. Louisiana Delta Hardwood Lumber Co.,
Inc., 182 So. 362 (La. App. 1938). See McCastle v. Architectural Stone Co., 4
So. (2d) 120 (La. App. 1941), setting aside a compromise entered into by "an
ignorant negro" unrepresented by counsel on the ground that the employee
suffered from an error which "partook both of the nature of error of law and
an error of fact."
10. Musick v. Central Carbon Co., Inc., 166 La. 355, 117 So. 277 (1928). The
supreme court distinguished this case from the principal case on the ground
that It Involved a bona fide dispute over the employer's liability under the
act, whereas, in the case under consideration the dispute was merely over
the duration of disability, liability under the act not being questioned.
11. Young v. Glynn, 171 La. 371, 131 So. 51 (1930). This case was dis-'
tinguished in the Puchner decision on the ground that the sole issue for re-
view was fraud, and the court, finding no fraud, reinstated the lower court's
decision. But see the report of the case, 171 La. at 373, 131 So. at 52. "In
Musick v. Central Carbon Co.... this court held that the prohibition of sub-
section 8 . . .did not apply where there existed grounds for difference as to
what might be due. And in this case there certainly existed grounds for dif-
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In the principal case the Louisiana Supreme Court appar-
ently established the new rule that compromises are invalid un-
der the act. The court was of the opinion that the provision in
Section 17 requiring the agreement to be "substantially in accord
with the various provisions of the act" connected it with all other
pertinent provisions, and undoubtedly the lawmakers intended
that a settlement under Section 17 in the nature of a lump sum
settlement was to be substantially in accord with the provision
dealing with lump sum settlements. 12
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to trans-
fer the loss due to certain industrial accidents from workmen as
a class and to provide, as a part of the cost of production, quick,
certain, and reasonably adequate compensation for industrial
accidents, independent of the fault of the employee.18 A weekly
compensation based upon the wages received and the extent of
the injury suffered is specifically provided by the act. 14 Finding
the act silent on the right of compromise, the Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that the legislature thought it best not to allow
compromises. The decision is founded also in the idea that public
policy disapproves of any attempt to drive a bargain with the em-
ployee which would result in his receiving a lower compensation
than is contemplated by the act.
In other states having acts similar to the Louisiana act, with
no express provision on the right to compromise, the courts are
divided as to the validity of an attempted compromise approved
by the commission or board.15 The great majority of jurisdictions,
ference of opinion as to how much longer plaintiff would require for con-
valescence."
12. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(9), as last amended by La. Act 242 of 1928, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1932) §§ 4407]. A lump sum settlement can be effected only
when both parties agree on all issues, but there must be a bona fide dispute
before a compromise can be made.
Mr. Justice O'Neill took the position that there is no connection between
Section 17 and Section 8(9). He said that an amicable settlement need not
be made in a lump sum and if the settlement fixes a weekly compensation,
then Section 8(9) would not apply.
13. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 513, § 207; Prosser,
The Law of Torts (1941) 519, § 69. See also Bradbury, Workmen's Compen-
sation Law (3 ed. 1917) 1-7; Mayer, Workmen's Compensation in Louisiana
(1937) 1-7; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3 ed. 1941) 1-26.
14. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8, as last amended by La. Act 242 of 1928, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4398].
15. Foster's Case, 123 Me. 27, 121 Atl. 89 (1923) (compromise valid);
Walker v. State Compensation Commissioner, 107 W.Va. 531, 149 S.E. 604
(1929) (compromise invalid as against public policy). See State ex rel. Wein-




however, have an express provision permitting compromises un-
der the act.1
It can be argued that the decision in the instant case should
be limited to the case where there is a dispute over the duration
of disability. This position is supported by the statement in the
original opinion that compromises will be valid where the letter
and spirit of the law justifies them. An example cited is when the
employer's liability under the act is disputed.
However, the implications of the decision indicate that the
court may be prepared to throw out all compromises. Certain
dictum supports this view. 7 The court's position is that a com-
promise will not be allowed because the duration of disability is
not a proper object of speculation and, further, because comprom-
ises are not expressly provided for in the act. This reasoning
might be applied to all compromises, regardless of the nature of
the dispute between the parties.
In view of the strong possibility that the Louisiana courts
will hereafter refuse to sanction any workmen's compensation
compromise which does not meet the statutory requirements of
lump sum settlements, the advisability of attempting to com-
promise any claim is highly questionable until further adjudica-
tions by the courts or legislative amendments to the Compensa-
tion Act clarify the legal status of the compromise.
W. F. M. M., Jr.
16. Thirty-one states and England, in their workmen's compensation acts,
expressly allow compromises to be made with approval of the commission or
board. (4 Schneider, op. cit. supra note 13, at 4441, cites thirty states which
expressly allow compromises. Examination of the statutes reveals the fact
that Montana should be added to the list. See Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (An-
derson and McFarland, 1935) § 2926. See also Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 77, § 731. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,
52 Stat. 1164 (1938), 33 U.S.C.A. § 908(i) (1940) permits compromises in very
narrow, designated cases when approved by the commissioner.
Tennessee and Louisiana are the only two states having the Workmen's
Compensation Act administered solely by the court. 4 Schneider, op. cit. supra
note 13. (Notice that Section 8 in this citation is limited by Section 7 and
Section 9).
17. In the original opinion is found, "Section 17 was intended to fix the
procedure which was to be followed in making settlements under the act
when there was no dispute or disagreement between the parties and was in-
tended to complement sub-section 8 of Section 8 (now sub-section 9), which
merely made provision for lump sum settlements without prescribing the
procedure."
In the opinion on rehearing, "The statute provides that compensation
shall be paid for the injuries producing total permanent disability.... This
provision is mandatory."
These dicta appear to indicate an attack on all compromises.
